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Montgomery curves and their arithmetic
The case of large characteristic fields
Craig Costello · Benjamin Smith
A survey in tribute to Peter L. Montgomery
Abstract Three decades ago, Montgomery introduced a new elliptic curve
model for use in Lenstra’s ECM factorization algorithm. Since then, his curves
and the algorithms associated with them have become foundational in the
implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems. This article surveys the theory
and cryptographic applications of Montgomery curves over non-binary finite
fields, including Montgomery’s x-only arithmetic and Ladder algorithm, x-
only Diffie–Hellman, y-coordinate recovery, and 2-dimensional and Euclidean
differential addition chains such as Montgomery’s PRAC algorithm.
Keywords Montgomery curve · Montgomery ladder · elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy · scalar multiplication
1 Introduction
Peter L. Montgomery’s landmark 1987 paper Speeding the Pollard and elliptic
curve methods of factorization [38] introduced what became known as Mont-
gomery curves and the Montgomery ladder as a way of accelerating Lenstra’s
ECM factorization method [33]. However, they have gone on to have a far
broader impact: while remaining a crucial component of modern factoring
software, they have also become central to elliptic curve cryptography.
Consider the following situation: let q be a prime power and let E be an
elliptic curve over Fq, with group law⊕, identity point O, and negation map ⊖.
We have scalar multiplication endomorphisms on E defined by
[k] : P 7−→ P ⊕ · · · ⊕ P
︸ ︷︷ ︸
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E-mail: smith@lix.polytechnique.fr
2 Craig Costello, Benjamin Smith
for every k in Z (with [−k]P := [k](⊖P )). The negation map ⊖ is an auto-
morphism of E , and the quotient of E by 〈⊖〉 is the 2-to-1 mapping
x : E −→ P1 ∼= E/〈⊖〉
such that x(P ) = x(Q) if and only if P = Q or P = ⊖Q. If E is defined by a
Weierstrass equation y2 = f(x), then x is just P 7→ x(P ); in other models or
coordinate systems, x may be more complicated. We call P1 the x-line of E .
Now, P1 does not inherit any group structure from E . But since⊖ commutes
with [k] (i.e., [k](⊖P ) = ⊖[k]P ), we still get an induced pseudomultiplication
x(P ) 7−→ x([k]P )
on P1 for every k in Z.
In his seminal article proposing elliptic curves for use in cryptography,
Miller [37] pointed out that elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman key exchange can
be expressed entirely in terms of the maps x(P ) 7→ x([k]P ): given a public
base point x(P ) on P1, Alice (resp. Bob) can compute and publish x([a]P )
(resp. x([b]P )) for some secret a and b, and then derive the shared secret
x([b][a]P ) = x([a][b]P ) from x([b]P ) (resp. x([a]P )). We can always lift the
resulting Diffie–Hellman problem to E , so E provides not only the map x, but
also the security of the whole protocol; but by working in P1(Fq) instead of
E(Fq) we can save some space, and (hopefully) some time.
As a second application, consider ECM. We are given an integer N whose
prime factorization is unknown. Choosing a random elliptic curve E over Z/NZ
and constructing a point P in E(Z/NZ), we can compute [B!]P for some
moderate bound B; if there exists a prime factor p of N such that #E(Fp)
is B-smooth, then we will have [B!]P ≡ O (mod p); and we can detect this
situation by taking the GCD of the projective Z-coordinate of [B!]P (for a
Weierstrass model of E) with N . If the GCD is neither 1 nor N , then we have
found a factor of N ; otherwise, we can try again with another random E . But
all this still holds if we replace P with x(P ) and [B!]P with x([B!]P ); and the
advantages of compactness and simplicity that we can see in Diffie–Hellman
on P1 are magnified in the ECM context, where the integer N can be much
larger than any reasonable cryptographic q.
In both scenarios, our task is simple: we need to define a class of curves E
equipped with efficient algorithms for computing x(P ) 7→ x([k]P ) on P1.
Montgomery’s work provides a brilliant answer to this problem. The Mont-
gomery ladder is a simple yet efficient algorithm for computing x(P ) 7→
x([k]P ). In the abstract, the ladder is a sequence of steps of pseudo-operations
derived from the curve E (see §3.1); choosing a Montgomery curve for E en-
sures that each of those steps is optimized. The result, for Montgomery, was
an extremely efficient implementation of ECM; and even today, three decades
later, Montgomery’s methods remain at the heart of state-of-the-art factoring
software such as the widely-distributed GMP-ECM package [24,49]. Later, these
same qualities also led to many efficient implementations of elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems, most notably Bernstein’s Curve25519 software [3].
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Notation. Throughout, we work over the finite field Fq, where q is a power of
an odd prime p (for most contemporary applications, q = p or p2). We write
M, S, a, and s for the cost of a single multiplication, squaring, addition, and
subtraction in Fq, respectively. We will occasionally need to multiply by some
constant elements of Fq, which we hope to make as cheap as possible: we write
c for the cost of a single such multiplication, to help keep track of this cost
separately from the other multiplications with two variable inputs.
2 Montgomery curves
A Montgomery curve over Fq is an elliptic curve defined by an affine equation
E(A,B) : By2 = x(x2 +Ax + 1) ,
where A and B are parameters in Fq satisfying
1 B 6= 0 and A2 6= 4. Moving
to projective plane coordinates (X : Y : Z), with
x = X/Z and y = Y/Z ,
we have the projective model
E(A,B) : BY 2Z = X(X2 +AXZ + Z2) ⊆ P2 . (1)
There is a unique point O = (0 : 1 : 0) at infinity on E(A,B): it is the only point
on E(A,B) where Z = 0.
2.1 The parameters A and B
AMontgomery curve E(A,B) is specified by two parameters,A and B. The most
important of the two is A, which controls the geometry of E(A,B). Indeed, the
j-invariant of E(A,B) is
j(E(A,B)) =
256(A2 − 3)3
A2 − 4 , (2)
so the Fq-isomorphism class of E(A,B) is completely determined by A2, and
independent of B. We see immediately that not every elliptic curve over Fq
has a Montgomery model over Fq, since while every element of Fq is the j-
invariant of some curve over Fq, not every element of Fq is in the form of the
right-hand-side of (2) for some A in Fq (we return to the question of which
curves have Montgomery models in §2.4 below).
The parameter B should be thought of as a “twisting factor”: if B′ is an-
other nonzero element of Fq, then E(A,B) ∼= E(A,B′) via (x, y) 7→ (x,
√
B/B′y).
This isomorphism is defined over Fq precisely when B/B
′ is a square in Fq.
1 These conditions imply nonsingularity: if B = 0 then E(A,B) is a union of three lines,
while if A2 = 4 then E(A,B) is a nodal cubic.
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Otherwise, E(A,B′) is a quadratic twist of E(A,B): isomorphic to E(A,B) over Fq2 ,
but not over Fq.
2 All such quadratic twists E(A,B′) of E(A,B) are isomorphic
to each other over Fq: if B
′′ is another element of Fq such that B/B
′′ is not
a square, then B′/B′′ must be a square, and then E(A,B′) and E(A,B′′) are
isomorphic over Fq via (x, y) 7→ (x,
√
B′/B′′y).
The value ofB (modulo squares) is more or less incidental for cryptographic
implementations. In the context of ECM, the ability to choose B gives us an
important degree of freedom for constructing interesting points in E(Z/NZ).
But when the values of B and B′ are mathematically and practically irrelevant
(i.e., most of the time), we will simply call E(A,B′) the quadratic twist of E(A,B).
In general, we use E ′ to denote the quadratic twist of E .
2.2 The group law
Since E(A,B) is an elliptic curve, there is a group law ⊕ on its points; our first
task is to describe it. For the moment, it suffices to work in affine coordinates;
optimized projective formulæ will follow later in §3.
The point O at infinity acts as the zero element of the group structure; the
negation map is ⊖ : (x : y : 1) 7→ (x : −y : 1). For addition, if P = (xP , yP )
and Q = (xQ, yQ) are points on E(A,B), then P ⊕Q = (x⊕, y⊕) where
x⊕ = Bλ
2 − (xP + xQ)−A and y⊕ = (2xP + xQ +A)λ−Bλ3 − yP
= λ(xP − xQ)− yP ,
with
λ =
{
(yQ − yP )/(xQ − xP ) if P 6= Q or ⊖Q ,
(3x2P + 2AxP + 1)/(2ByP ) if P = Q ;
if P = ⊖Q, then P ⊕Q = O. We note that λ is the slope of the secant through
P and Q (or the tangent to E(A,B) at P , in the case P = Q).
As usual, we write E(A,B)(Fq) for the group of rational points of E(A,B)
(that is, projective solutions of (1)) with coordinates in Fq. The m-torsion
E [m] is the kernel of the scalar multiplication [m]. In general, its elements are
defined over some extension of Fq; we write E [m](Fq) for the group ofm-torsion
elements whose coordinates are in Fq.
2.3 Special torsion and group structures
What can we say about the group structure of E(A,B)(Fq)?
2 We saw above that since j(E(A,B)) is a function of A2, the Fq-isomorphism class of E(A,B)
depends only on A2. Indeed, E(−A,B) is Fq-isomorphic (via (x, y) 7→ (−x, y)) to E(A,−B),
which is Fq-isomorphic to E(A,B) if −1 is a square in Fq (otherwise it is a quadratic twist).
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Table 1 4-torsion structures on a Montgomery curve E(A,B) and its quadratic twist E(A,B′).
B A− 2 and A+ 2 E(A,B)[4](Fq) contains E(A,B′)[4](Fq) contains
square both square Z/4Z× Z/2Z Z/2Z × Z/2Z
square one square Z/4Z Z/4Z
square neither square Z/2Z× Z/2Z Z/4Z × Z/2Z
nonsquare both square Z/2Z× Z/2Z Z/4Z × Z/2Z
nonsquare one square Z/4Z Z/4Z
nonsquare neither square Z/4Z× Z/2Z Z/2Z × Z/2Z
We note immediately that E(A,B) always has a rational point of order two,
T := (0 : 0 : 1) ∈ E(A,B)[2](Fq) ;
the translation map on E(A,B) taking P to P ⊕ T is
τT : (x, y) 7−→ (1/x,−y/x2) . (3)
In projective coordinates, we can see one of the characteristic features of Mont-
gomery curves more clearly. On any elliptic curve E with a point T of order 2,
the translation-by-T map on E commutes with ⊖, so it induces an involution
on the x-line P1 = E/〈⊖〉, which has the form (X : Z) 7→ (aX+bZ : cX+dZ).
But for T = (0, 0) on a Montgomery curve E(A,B), this involution is as simple
as possible: here, τT induces (X : Z) 7→ (Z : X) on P1.
Montgomery notes in [38], following Suyama, that the order of E(A,B)(Fq)
is always divisible by 4. The nonsingularity condition requires B, A + 2, and
A − 2 to be nonzero. If we let E(A,B′) be the quadratic twist of E(A,B), then
the following facts are easy to check:
1. If B(A+2) is a square in Fq, then (1,±
√
(A+ 2)/B) are points of order 4
in E(A,B)(Fq) (and if B(A+2) is not a square, then (1,±
√
(A+ 2)/B′) are
points of order 4 in E(A,B′)(Fq)).3
2. Similarly, if B(A−2) is a square in Fq, then (−1,±
√
(A− 2)/B) are points
of order 4 in E(A,B)(Fq); otherwise, (−1,±
√
(A− 2)/B′) are points of or-
der 4 in E(A,B′)(Fq).
3. If neither B(A+2) nor B(A−2) is a square, then A2−4 must be a square;
then x2 + Ax + 1 splits completely over Fp, so E(A,B) has full rational 2-
torsion. If α is one root of x2+Ax+1, then the other root is 1/α; the points
(α : 0 : 1) and (1 : 0 : α) have order 2, and are exchanged by τT . There are
also points of order two on E(A,B′) with exactly the same coordinates.
The key thing is that in any finite field, B(A+2), B(A−2), and A2−4 cannot
all be nonsquares simultaneously: at least one of the above situations is forced
to occur, and so #E(A,B)(Fq) is always divisible by 4. Table 1 summarizes the
resulting group structures for various combinations of the three conditions.
Going further, Suyama shows that if we take A = −(3a4+6a2−1)/4a3 and
B = (a2 − 1)2/4ab2 for some a and b in Fq with ab(a2 − 1)(9a2 − 1) 6= 0, then
3 Montgomery notes that in an ECM context we can take B = A + 2 in order to force
(1, 1) to be a rational point of order 4.
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(a, b) is a point of order 3 in E(A,B)(Fq). This is useful in ECM, where we want
to produce curves whose reduction modulo p have smooth order; reducing a
curve from Suyama’s parametrization yields a curve whose order is divisible
by 12, and hence more probably smooth than a the order of a random curve.
For cryptographic constructions, we generally want #E(A,B)(Fq) to be as
near prime as possible. A Montgomery curve over a finite field can never
have prime order: we always have 4 | #E(A,B)(Fq) (and 4 | #E(A,B′)(Fq)), so
the best we can hope for is #E(A,B)(Fq) = 4r with r prime. Reassuringly,
there is no theoretical obstruction to the existence of E(A,B)/Fq such that
#E(A,B)(Fq) = 4r with r prime; and indeed, in practice we have no trouble
finding A and B in Fq such that #E(A,B)(Fq)/4 is prime.
2.4 Correspondence with short Weierstrass models
Any Montgomery curve over Fq can be transformed into a short Weierstrass
model over Fq (assuming q is not a power of 3): for example, the rational maps
(x, y) 7→ (u, v) = (B(x+A/3), B2y) and (u, v) 7→ (x, y) = (u/B −A/3, v/B2)
define an isomorphism over Fq between E(A,B) and the short Weierstrass model
EW : v2 = u3 + (B2(1 −A2/3))u+B3A/3(2A2/9− 1) .
The converse does not hold: not every short Weierstrass model can be
transformed into a Montgomery model over Fq. This is obvious enough: not
every short Weierstrass model has a rational point of order 2 to map to T (and
not every j-invariant in Fq can be expressed in the form of (2) with A in Fq).
Still, it is useful to have a simple algebraic condition on the coefficients of a
short Weierstrass model that encapsulate its transformability to Montgomery
form. With this in mind, Okeya, Kurumatani, and Sakurai [41] observe that
EW : v2 = u3 + au + b has a Montgomery model if and only if there exist α
and β in Fq such that α
3 + aα + b = 0 and 3α2 + a = β2: we then have an
isomorphism (u, v) 7→ (x, y) = ((u − α)/β, v/β) from EW to the Montgomery
curve E(3α/β,1/β). The first relation ensures that there is a rational 2-torsion
point (α, 0) in EW (Fq) (which is mapped to T = (0, 0) by the isomorphism);
the second ensures that translation by the image of that point acts as in (3).
2.5 Correspondence with twisted Edwards models
The last decade has seen the great success of Edwards models for elliptic curves
in cryptographic implementations (see eg. [23], [7], and [5]). It turns out that
every Montgomery curve over Fq is Fq-isomorphic to a twisted Edwards model,
and vice versa [5, §3]. The rational maps
(x, y) 7−→(u, v) = (x/y, (x− 1)/(x+ 1)) (4)
(u, v) 7−→(x, y) = ((1 + v)/(1 − v), (1 + v)/((1 − v)u) (5)
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define an isomorphism between E(A,B) and the twisted Edwards model
EEd(a,d) : au2 + v2 = 1 + du2v2 where
{
a = (A+ 2)/B ,
d = (A− 2)/B .
(6)
The most natural projective closure for EEd(a,d) is not in P2, but in P1×P1, which
embeds into P3 via the Segre morphism. Taking coordinates (U0 : U1 : U2 : U3)
on P3, with u = U1/U0, v = U2/U0, and uv = U3/U0, we obtain the projective
model EEd(a,d) : U20 +dU23 = aU21+U22 , U0U3 = U1U2 (the second equation defines
the image of P1×P1 in P3); these are the extended Edwards coordinates of [29].
The point O on E(A,B) maps to (0, 1) = (1 : 0 : 1 : 0) on EEd(a,d). The negation
is ⊖(u, v) = (−u, v), and the map x : EEd(a,d) → P1 sends P to v(P ); if EEd(a,d) is
viewed as a curve in P1 × P1, then x is just projection onto the second factor.
The distinguished 2-torsion point T maps to (0,−1) = (1 : 0 : −1 : 0), and the
translation τT becomes (U0 : U1 : U2 : U3) 7→ (U0 : U1 : −U2 : −U3) on EEd(a,d).
We can also consider the images of the other torsion points described
in §2.3. The 2-torsion points (−12 (A ±
√
A2 − 4), 0) on E(A,B) map to (0 :
(A−2) : 0 : ±
√
A2 − 4) on EEd(a,d), while the 4-torsion points (1,±
√
(A+ ǫ2)/B)
map to (±
√
(A+ ǫ2)/B : 1 : 0 : 0) for ǫ = ±1.
3 Fast differential arithmetic in P1
In projective coordinates, the quotient map x : E(A,B) → E/〈⊖〉 = P1 is
x : P 7−→
{
(xP : 1) if P = (xP : yP : 1) ,
(1 : 0) if P = O = (0 : 1 : 0) .
We emphasize that the formula x((X : Y : Z)) = (X : Z) only holds on the
open subset of E(A,B) where Z 6= 0; it does not extend to the point O = (0 :
1 : 0) at infinity, because (0 : 0) is not a projective point.
3.1 Pseudo-operations
Our first step towards computing x(P ) 7→ x([k]P ) is to define efficient pseudo-
group operations on P1 derived from the group operation on E(A,B). As we
noted earlier, P1 inherits no group structure from E(A,B): in particular, there
is no map (x(P ),x(Q)) 7→ x(P ⊕ Q). This is because x(P ) determines P
only up to sign, so while (x(P ),x(Q)) mathematically determines the pair
{x(P ⊕Q),x(P ⊖Q)}, we cannot tell which of the values is the correct “sum”.
However, any three of the values {x(P ),x(Q),x(P⊕Q),x(P⊖Q))} determines
the fourth, so we can define a pseudo-addition on P1 by
xADD : (x(P ),x(Q),x(P ⊖Q)) 7−→ x(P ⊕Q) .
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The degenerate case where P = Q becomes a pseudo-doubling
xDBL : x(P ) 7−→ x([2]P ) .
These two operations will be the basis of our efficient pseudomultiplications.
Our first task is to compute xADD and xDBL efficiently. Let P = (xP , yP )
and Q = (xQ, yQ) be points on E(A,B), with neither equal to T or O (so in
particular, xP and xQ are both nonzero). Montgomery observed that if P 6= Q,
then the x-coordinates of P , Q, P ⊕Q, and P ⊖Q are related by
xP⊕QxP⊖Q(xP − xQ)2 = (xPxQ − 1)2 , (7)
while in the case P = Q, writing [2]P = (x[2]P , y[2]P ), we have
4x[2]PxP (x
2
P +AxP + 1) = (x
2
P − 1)2 . (8)
Analogous identities exist for general Weierstrass models, but they are much
simpler for Montgomery curves—as we will see in §3.4. It is this simplicity, due
to the special form of τT discussed in §2.3, that leads to particularly efficient
pseudo-operations for Montgomery curves.
3.2 Pseudo-addition
Our aim is to compute x(P ⊕ Q) in terms of x(P ), x(Q), and x(P ⊖Q); we
suppose P 6= Q and P ⊖Q 6= T . Following Montgomery [38, §10.3.1], we move
to projective coordinates and write
(XP : ZP ) := x(P ) , (XQ : ZQ) := x(Q) ,
(X⊕ : Z⊕) := x(P ⊕Q) , (X⊖ : Z⊖) := x(P ⊖Q) .
Since P ⊖ Q /∈ {O, T }, we know that X⊖ 6= 0 and Z⊖ 6= 0. Equation (7)
therefore becomes the pair of simultaneous relations
{
X⊕ = Z⊖ [(XP − ZP )(XQ + ZQ) + (XP + ZP )(XQ − ZQ)]2 ,
Z⊕ = X⊖ [(XP − ZP )(XQ + ZQ)− (XP + ZP )(XQ − ZQ)]2 ,
(9)
which Algorithm 1 applies to efficiently compute x(P ⊕Q). If the “difference”
x(P ⊖Q) is fixed then we can normalize it to (XP : 1), thus saving one multi-
plication in Step 11. Note that xADD involves neither of the curve parameters
A or B, so it is identical for all Montgomery curves.
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Algorithm 1: xADD: differential addition on P1
Input: (XP , ZP ), (XQ, ZQ), and (X⊖, Z⊖) in F
2
q such that (XP : ZP ) = x(P ),
(XQ : ZQ) = x(Q), and (X⊖ : Z⊖) = x(P ⊖Q) for P and Q in E(Fq)
Output: (X⊕, Z⊕) in F2q such that (X⊕ : Z⊕) = x(P ⊕Q) if P ⊖Q /∈ {O, T},
otherwise X⊕ = Z⊕ = 0
Cost: 4M+ 2S+ 3a + 3s, or 3M + 2S+ 3a+ 3s if Z⊖ is normalized to 1
1 V0 ← XP + ZP // 1a
2 V1 ← XQ − ZQ // 1s
3 V1 ← V1 · V0 // 1M
4 V0 ← XP − ZP // 1s
5 V2 ← XQ + ZQ // 1a
6 V2 ← V2 · V0 // 1M
7 V3 ← V1 + V2 // 1a
8 V3 ← V23 // 1S
9 V4 ← V1 − V2 // 1s
10 V4 ← V24 // 1S
11 X⊕ ← Z⊖ · V3 // 1M / 0M if Z⊖ = 1
12 Z⊕ ← X⊖ · V4 // 1M
13 return (X⊕ : Z⊕)
3.3 Pseudo-doubling
It remains to handle the doubling case, where Q = P . We want to compute
(X[2]P : Z[2]P ) := x([2]P ) in terms of x(P ). Again, we follow [38, §10.3.1]: in
projective coordinates, Equation (8) becomes the pair of simultaneous relations
{
X[2]P = (XP + ZP )
2(XP − ZP )2 ,
Z[2]P = (4XPZP )((XP − ZP )2 + ((A+ 2)/4)(4XPZP )) .
(10)
Algorithm 2 uses these, and the identity 4XPZP = (XP+ZP )
2−(XP−ZP )2, to
efficiently compute (X[2]P : Z[2]P ). The fact that the right-hand-sides of (10)
are symmetric under (XP : ZP ) ↔ (ZP : XP ) reflects the fact that the
doubling map [2] factors through the 2-isogeny E(A,B) → E(A,B)/〈T 〉; this
aspect of Montgomery’s x-line arithmetic later found an echo in Doche, Icart,
and Kohel’s work on efficient doubling and tripling [19].
Algorithm 2: xDBL: pseudo-doubling on P1 from E(A,B)
Input: (XP , ZP ) in F
2
q such that (XP : ZP ) = x(P ) for P in E(Fq)
Output: (X[2]P , Z[2]P ) in F
2
q such that (X[2]P : Z[2]P ) = x([2]P ) if P /∈ {O,T},
otherwise Z[2]P = 0
Cost: 2M+ 2S+ 1c + 3a + 1s
1 V1 ← XP + ZP // 1a
2 V1 ← V21 // 1S
3 V2 ← XP − ZP // 1s
4 V2 ← V22 // 1S
5 X[2]P ← V1 · V2 // 1M
6 V1 ← V1 − V2 // 1s
7 V3 ← ((A+ 2)/4) · V1 // 1c
8 V3 ← V3 + V2 // 1a
9 Z[2]P ← V1 · V3 // 1M
10 return (X[2]P : Z[2]P )
Step 7 of Algorithm 2 is a multiplication by the constant (A + 2)/4. We
emphasize that this is the only place in the x-line arithmetic where the pa-
rameter A appears. The parameter B never appears at all: x-line arithmetic is
twist-agnostic. For implementations, therefore, we try to choose A such that
the cost of multiplying by (A+2)/4 is minimised (for example, taking A such
that (A+ 2)/4 is particularly small).
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3.4 Comparison with general x-line arithmetic
To see how Montgomery’s choice of curve model contributes to efficient x-line
arithmetic, it is instructive to compare the pseudo-addition with the equivalent
formulæ for a general Weierstrass model
E : y2 = x3 + f2x2 + f1x+ f0 .
The analogues of (7) and (8) for E are x⊕x⊖(xP − xQ)2 = (xPxQ − f1)2 −
4f0(xP+xQ+f2) and 4x[2]P (x
3
P+f2x
2
P+f1xP+f0) = (x
2
P−f1)2−4f0(2xP+f2),
respectively. In projective coordinates, these become the relatively complicated
pseudo-addition formulæ
{
X⊕ = Z⊖
[
(XPXQ − f1ZPZQ)2 − 4f0(ZPXQ +XPZQ + f2ZPZQ)ZPZQ
]
Z⊕ = X⊖(ZPXQ −XPZQ)2
and pseudo-doubling formulæ
{
X[2]P = (X
2
P − f1Z2P )2 − 4f0(2XPZP + f2Z2P )Z2P ,
Z[2]P = 4(X
4
P + f2X
2
PZ
2
P + f1XPZ
3
P + f0Z
4
P ) .
If we specialize and take f2 = 0, leaving f1 and f0 free, then we are in the
case of short Weierstrass models (for which the affine formulæ are classical:
see eg. [12, Formulary]). This imposes no special structure on E , since every
elliptic curve is isomorphic to a short Weierstrass model over Fq. The resulting
projective formulæ were proposed for side-channel-aware implementations by
Brier and Joye [10, §4], with pseudo-addition requiring 7M+2S+2c+3a+2s
and pseudo-doubling 3M+ 4S+ 2c+ 6a+ 2s.
But we can simplify things more dramatically by taking f0 = 0 instead,
leaving f1 and f2 free. This is equivalent to requiring a rational 2-torsion point
on E , which we move to (0, 0). The pseudo-addition formulæ become
(X⊕ : Z⊕) =
(
Z⊖(XPXQ − f1ZPZQ)2 : X⊖(ZPXQ −XPZQ)2
)
,
which can be evaluated in 6M+ 2S+ 1c+ 2s, while pseudo-doubling becomes
(X[2]P : Z[2]P ) =
(
(X2P − f1Z2P )2 : 4(X4P + f2X2PZ2P + f1XPZ3P )
)
,
which can be evaluated in 2M+ 4S+ 2c+ 4a+ 1s.
Now taking f1 = 1 not only eliminates 1c in the pseudo-addition and
pseudo-doubling, it also allows us to save 2M in the pseudo-addition and 2S
in the pseudo-doubling (at the cost of a few more additions and subtractions)
by exploiting the symmetry of the resulting forms4. Indeed, if we write A
for f2 and allow a possible quadratic twist by B, then we have arrived at
Montgomery’s model E : By2 = x(x2 + Ax + 1), and we recover the efficient
pseudo-addition and pseudo-doubling in (9) and (10).
4 Translation by the 2-torsion point (0, 0) is defined by (x, y) 7→ (f1/x,−f1y/x2); taking
f1 = 1 is therefore equivalent to putting this translation map in the special form of (3).
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4 The Montgomery ladder
We now resume our task of computing x(P ) 7→ x([k]P ). We begin by explain-
ing a version of the Montgomery ladder that uses full group operations to
compute P 7→ [k]P on E(A,B), before deriving the classic x-line Montgomery
ladder which computes x(P ) 7→ x([k]P ) using only xADD and xDBL. We then
present Okeya and Sakurai’s version of the López–Dahab trick, an appendix
to the x-only ladder which recovers the full image point [k]P on E(A,B).
4.1 The ladder in a group
Algorithm 3 presents the Montgomery ladder algorithm in the context of a
group, for ease of analysis. (While the algorithm is presented using a Mont-
gomery curve E(A,B), it is clear that it works in any abelian group).
Algorithm 3: Montgomery’s binary algorithm in the group E(A,B)(Fq)
Input: k =
∑ℓ−1
i=0 ki2
i with kℓ−1 = 1, and P ∈ E(Fq)
Output: [k]P
Cost: ℓ− 1 calls to ⊕ and ℓ calls to [2]
1 (R0,R1)← (P, [2]P )
2 for i = ℓ− 2 down to 0 do
3 if ki = 0 then
4 (R0,R1)← ([2]R0,R0 ⊕ R1)
5 else
6 (R0,R1)← (R0 ⊕ R1, [2]R1)
7 return R0
Algorithm 3 maintains two important invariants. First, looking at Lines 4
and 6, we see that the difference R1 ⊖ R0 never changes; then, looking at
Line 1, we see that that difference must always be P ; hence, at all times,
R1 = R0 ⊕ P . (11)
Second, after iteration i of the loop (counting downwards from ℓ− 2), we have
R0 = [(k)i]P and R1 = [(k)i + 1]P , where (k)i := ⌊k/2i⌋ . (12)
This proves the correctness of Algorithm 3: at Line 7 we have just finished
iteration i = 0, so we return R0 = [(k)0]P = [k]P . Equation (12) is easy to
see once we know (11): looking at R0 in each iteration, we recover the classic
double-and-add method for computing [k]P . First, R0 is initialized to P ; then,
if ki = 0 we double R0, while if ki = 1 we replace R0 with R0 ⊕ R1, which is
[2]R0 ⊕ P by (11)—that is, we double R0 and add P .
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4.2 The Montgomery ladder
Equations (11) and (12) allow us to transform Algorithm 3 into Algorithm 4,
known as the Montgomery ladder. We want to compute x(P ) 7→ x([k]P ). We
may suppose P 6= O, since x([k]O) = x(O) for all k, and we may also suppose
P 6= T , since x([k]T ) = x(T ) for odd k and x(O) for even k.
Maintaining the notation of (12), let (x0, x1) = (x([(k)i]P ),x([(k)i+1]P )).
Then (11) shows that we can compute (x([(k)i−1]P ),x([(k)i−1 + 1]P )) as
(xDBL(x0), xADD(x0, x1,x(P ))) or (xADD(x0, x1,x(P )), xDBL(x1)), depending on
the value of the bit ki.
5 We can therefore initialize (x0, x1) to (x(P ),x([2]P )) =
(x(P ), xDBL(x(P ))), and then applying the transitions above for each bit of k
will yield (x0, x1) = (x([k]P ),x([k + 1]P )).
While the final value of x0 is x([k]P ), the target of our calculation, we will
see in §4.3 that the final value x([k + 1]P ) of x1 can be used to help recover
the full group element [k]P , if desired. We therefore include x1 as an optional
second return value in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: LADDER: The Montgomery ladder
Input: k =
∑ℓ−1
i=0 ki2
i with kℓ−1 = 1, and (XP , ZP ) in F
2
q s.t. (XP : ZP ) = x(P )
Output: (Xk, Zk) ∈ F2q s.t. (Xk : Zk) = x([k]P ) if P /∈ {O,T}, otherwise Zk = 0.
Also optionally returns (Xk+1, Zk+1) ∈ F2q s.t. (Xk+1 : Zk+1) = x([k]P ) if
P /∈ {O, T}, otherwise Zk+1 = 0.
Cost: ℓ− 1 calls to xADD and ℓ calls to xDBL
1 (x0, x1)← ((XP , ZP ), xDBL((XP , ZP )))
2 for i = ℓ− 2 down to 0 do
3 if ki = 0 then
4 (x0, x1)← (xDBL(x0), xADD(x0, x1, (XP , ZP )))
5 else
6 (x0, x1)← (xADD(x0, x1, (XP , ZP )), xDBL(x1))
7 return x0 (and optionally x1)
4.3 Recovery of y-coordinates
On the surface, the Montgomery ladder appears to be an algorithm for com-
puting x([k]P ) from x(P ). However, López and Dahab [35] observed that
since it actually computes x([k]P ) and x([k + 1]P ), the ladder can easily be
extended to compute the full scalar multiplication P 7→ [k]P by first com-
puting x(P ) 7→ (x([k]P ),x([k + 1]P )) and then recovering [k]P from the data
(P,x([k]P ),x([k + 1]P )).
5 Since the xADD and xDBL calls always share an argument, it is common for high-
performance implementations to exploit any overlap between intermediate calculations in
the xADD and xDBL by merging them in one combined function.
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López and Dahab originally gave formulæ for this recovery step specific to
Montgomery curves over binary fields. Their results were extended to prime-
field Montgomery curves by Okeya and Sakurai [42], and later to short Weier-
strass models by Brier and Joye [10]. Kohel provides a more general and pow-
erful point of view in [31], treating the image of the curve under the map
Q 7→ (x(Q),x(Q ⊕ P )) as a new model of the elliptic curve itself.
Okeya and Sakurai proceed as follows. Suppose P is not in E(A,B)[2], and Q
is not in {P,⊖P,O}.6 In affine coordinates, writing (xP , yP ) = P , (xQ, yQ) =
Q, and (x⊕, y⊕) = P ⊕Q as usual, the group law formulæ in §2.2 show that
yQ can be deduced from xP , yP , xQ, and x⊕ using the relation
yQ =
(xPxQ + 1)(xP + xQ + 2A)− 2A− (xP − xQ)2x⊕
2ByP
(note the re-appearance of the twisting parameter B).
Algorithm 5, taken from [42, Algorithm 1], applies this to compute Q from
P , x(Q), and x(P⊕Q). Lines 6 and 15 involve multiplications by the constants
2A and 2B. Referring back to §3.3, if (A+2)/4 is chosen to be advantageously
small, then 2A = 8((A+2)/4)−4 is also small. Similarly, referring back to §2.1,
we can choose B such that multiplication by 2B is essentially free.
Algorithm 5: Recover: Okeya–Sakurai y-coordinate recovery
Input: (xP : yP : 1) = P , (XQ : ZQ) = x(Q), and (X⊕ : Z⊕) = x(P ⊕Q) for P and
Q in E(A,B)(Fq) with P /∈ E(A,B)[2] and Q /∈ {P,⊖P,O}.
Output: (X′ : Y ′ : Z′) = Q
Cost: 10M+ 1S+ 2c+ 3a+ 3s
1 v1 ← xP · ZQ // 1M
2 v2 ← XQ + v1 // 1a
3 v3 ← XQ − v1 // 1s
4 v3 ← v23 // 1S
5 v3 ← v3 ·X⊕ // 1M
6 v1 ← 2A · ZQ // 1c
7 v2 ← v2 + v1 // 1a
8 v4 ← xP ·XQ // 1M
9 v4 ← v4 + ZQ // 1a
10 v2 ← v2 · v4 // 1M
11 v1 ← v1 · ZQ // 1M
12 v2 ← v2 − v1 // 1s
13 v2 ← v2 · Z⊕ // 1M
14 Y ′ ← v2 − v3 // 1s
15 v1 ← 2B · yP // 1c
16 v1 ← v1 · ZQ // 1M
17 v1 ← v1 · Z⊕ // 1M
18 X′ ← v1 ·XQ // 1M
19 Z′ ← v1 · ZQ // 1M
20 return (X′ : Y ′ : Z′)
Combining Algorithms 4 and 5 yields Algorithm 6, an efficient scalar mul-
tiplication routine for the full group E(A,B)(Fq) using x-only arithmetic. This
is generally much more efficient than Algorithm 3.
5 Montgomery curves and ladders in elliptic curve cryptography
We saw in §2.3 that no Montgomery curve can have prime order, since their
order is always divisible by 4. The presence of this small cofactor 4 has no seri-
ous impact on the security level of a well-chosen Montgomery curve, since the
state of the art for solving discrete logarithms in large prime-order subgroups
of Montgomery curves is still Pollard’s rho method [43].
6 This is not a serious restriction in the context of scalar multiplication, where Q = [k]P :
if P is a point of order 2, then either [k]P = O or y([k]P ) = 0.
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Algorithm 6: Scalar multiplication on E(A,B)(Fq), combining the Mont-
gomery ladder with y-coordinate recovery
Input: k ∈ Z>0, and P in E(A,B)(Fq) \ E(A,B)[2](Fq)
Output: [k]P
1 (x0, x1)← LADDER(k, (XP , ZP )) where (XP : ZP ) = x(P )
2 Q← Recover(P, x0, x1)
3 return Q
5.1 Montgomery curves in cryptographic standards
None of the elliptic curves so far standardardized by NIST [40], Brainpool [22],
or ANSSI [1] can be transformed into Montgomery form over the base field,
because they all have prime order, so they are unfortunately incompatible
with Montgomery arithmetic. However, the two curves recently proposed by
the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) for standardization in the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol are specified in Montgomery form [32].
Example 1 (Curve25519 [3]) The most widely-known Montgomery curve in
contemporary cryptography is the curve used in Bernstein’s Curve25519 soft-
ware for Diffie–Hellman key exchange. This curve is defined by
E/Fp : y2 = x(x2 + 486662x+ 1) where p = 2255 − 19 .
We find #E(Fp) = 8r and #E ′(Fp) = 4r′, where r and r′ are 253-bit primes.
Example 2 (Curve448 [28]) Hamburg’s Curve448 offers a conservative, high-
strength alternative to Curve25519 for TLS. This curve is defined by
E/Fp : y2 = x(x2 + 156326x+ 1) where p = 2448 − 2224 − 1 .
We find #E(Fp) = 4r and #E ′(Fp) = 4r′, where r and r′ are 446- and 447-bit
primes, respectively.
5.2 Diffie–Hellman with x-coordinates
Recall Miller’s x-only Diffie–Hellman protocol, described in §1: Alice computes
(a,x(P )) 7→ x([a]P ) and transmits her public key x([a]P ) to Bob. Upon receiv-
ing Bob’s public key x([b]P ), she computes (a,x([b]P )) 7→ x([ab]P ) to arrive
at the same shared secret as Bob, who computes (b,x([a]P )) 7→ x([ba]P ). This
x-only protocol is the basis of Bernstein’s Curve25519 key exchange software.
But in addition to working entirely with x-coordinates, Bernstein observed
that the Montgomery form allows for another simplification in real-world im-
plementations. Recall from §2.1 that if E(A,B′)(Fq) is the quadratic twist of
E(A,B)(Fq), then precisely one of B and B′ is a square in Fq, and the other is
a non-square. It follows that every element xP in Fq corresponds to a point
P = (xP , yP ) which is either in E(A,B)(Fq), in E(A,B′)(Fq), or (if yP = 0)
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in both E(A,B)[2](Fq) and E(A,B′)[2](Fq). Bernstein chose the curve in Exam-
ple 1 by insisting that both E(A,B)(Fq) and E(A,B′)(Fq) have cryptographically
strong (i.e., almost prime) group orders. This means that every element of Fq
corresponds to a point on a cryptographically strong Montgomery curve, and
implementers need not perform any point validation checks [8] in this proto-
col. Moreover, since the Montgomery ladder does not use the constant B, it
correctly computes (x(P ), k) 7→ x([k]P ) irrespective of the twist that P lies
on. If both E(A,B) and E(A,B′) are secure, then E(A,B) is said to be twist-secure.
As we noted above, when implementing cryptosystems based on the dis-
crete logarithm or Diffie–Hellman problems, we generally want #E(A,B)(Fq) as
close to prime as possible. We have #E(A,B)(Fq) + #E(A,B′)(Fq) = 2q + 2, as
with any elliptic curve-twist pair over Fq; so if E(A,B)(Fq) = 4r with r prime,
then the closest we can come to prime order for the twist is #E(A,B′)(Fq) = 4r′
with r′ prime if q ≡ 3 (mod 4), and #E(A,B′)(Fq) = 8r′ with r′ prime if q ≡ 1
(mod 4). We do not know of any theoretical asymptotic results guaranteeing a
density or distribution of twist-secure Montgomery curves over any finite field,
but there does not seem to be any problem in finding such curves in practice.7
The presence of non-trivial cofactors means that care must be taken in
certain scenarios to thwart the threat of small subgroup attacks [34]. For x-
line Diffie–Hellman, the easiest way to do this is to define all secret scalars to
be a multiple of the lowest common multiple of the curve and twist cofactors.
5.3 Constant-time ladders
For secure software implementations of ECC, it is important that scalar mul-
tiplication routines exhibit uniform execution patterns with no correlation
between timing and secret data; such constant-time behaviour is an essential
first step towards preventing timing attacks [30]. Unlike many other addition
chains and scalar multiplication algorithms, the Montgomery ladder has an
inherently uniform execution pattern. Nevertheless, a number of issues must
still be addressed in order to achieve constant-time implementations.
As it stands, the length of the main loop in Algorithm 4 is determined
by the bitlength k of the input scalar m ∈ [0, r). There are two common
strategies for making the loop length independent of k. One option is to require
all scalars to have their top bit set, either by defining them that way (as
was done in [3]) or by adding a small, fixed multiple of the (sub)group order
to each scalar. A second option is to modify Step 1 of Algorithm 4, setting
(x0, x1)← (x(O),x(P )) instead of (x(P ),x([2]P )). Since the formulæ for xDBL
and xADD behave correctly under these inputs, x0 and x1 will remain unchanged
until the first non-zero bit of the scalar k is encountered, so a constant-length
loop can be achieved by accepting scalars as all bitstrings of a fixed length.
Algorithm 4 presents the ladder using an if statement. Since each if rep-
resents branching on potentially secret data, and these branches may be mea-
7 An analysis of the frequency of prime-order curves with prime-order twists appears
in [45]; but this does not apply to Montgomery curves, since they cannot have prime order.
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sured in timing variations, it is standard practice to replace the branches with
conditional swaps (such as the SWAP defined in Algorithm 7) to avoid leak-
ing information on secret scalars. The result is Algorithm 8, which consists
of a uniform sequence of xDBLs and xADDs. Provided the field arithmetic used
by the xADD and xDBL specified in Algorithms 1 and 2 is implemented in a
completely uniform way, this yields a completely uniform algorithm.
Algorithm 7: SWAP: Constant-time conditional swap.
Input: b ∈ {0, 1} and a pair (x0, x1) of objects encoded as n-bit strings
Output: (xb, x1−b)
1 b← (b, . . . , b)n
2 v← b and (x0 xor x1) // bitwise and, xor; do not short-circuit and
3 return (x0 xor v, x1 xor v)
Algorithm 8: A uniform Montgomery ladder
Input: k =
∑ℓ−1
i=0 ki2
i with kℓ−1 = 1, and x(P ) for P in E(A,B)(Fq)
Output: (Xk, Zk) ∈ F2q s.t. (Xk : Zk) = x([k]P ) if P /∈ {O,T}, otherwise Zk = 0.
Cost: ℓ− 1 calls to xADD, ℓ calls to xDBL, and ℓ− 1 calls to SWAP
1 (x0, x1)← (xDBL((XP , ZP )), (XP , ZP ))
2 for i = ℓ− 2 down to 0 do
3 (x0, x1)← SWAP((ki+1 xor ki), (x0, x1))
4 (x0, x1)← (xDBL(x0), xADD(x0, x1, (XP , ZP )))
5 (x0, x1)← SWAP(k0, (x0, x1))
6 return x0
5.4 Completeness and Bernstein’s modified x-map
Algorithms 4 and 8 do not compute the pseudomultiplication x([k]P ) correctly
if P = O or T : instead, they return (Xk, Zk) = (e, 0) for some e in Fq (see [2,
Theorem 4.3] for a more precise statement). In some cases emay be 0, in which
case (Xk : Zk) = (0 : 0) is not even a projective point; but even if e 6= 0, the
resulting (Xk : Zk) = (1 : 0) may not be equal to x([k]P ).
In Montgomery’s original context of ECM, this is a feature, not a bug: the
ultimate goal there is to produce (Xk, Zk) such that gcd(Zk, N) > 1, regardless
of whether or not (Xk : Zk) is a correct pseudomultiplication result, or even a
legal projective point. But it presents a complication for x-line Diffie–Hellman,
because it appears that the parties in a key exchange are obliged to carry out
some zero checks to ensure that the inputs are not x(O) or x(T ).
Bernstein shows that a modest modification to the map x allows such
checks to be omitted entirely [2, Theorem 5.1]. The result is a Diffie–Hellman
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key exchange where the inputs are not points on the x-line, but simple finite
field elements, by using the mapping x0 : E(A,B)(Fq)→ Fq defined by
x0 : P 7−→
{
0 if P = O
x if P = (x, y)
.
in place of x. This means using the ladder with input (XP , ZP ) = (x, 1), where
x = x0(P ) for any P on E(A,B) or its twist—so x can be any element of Fq—
then returning xk = XkZ
q−2
k in Fq instead of (Xk, Zk). Note that xk = Xk/Zk
if Zk 6= 0, and 0 otherwise; in either case, xk = x0([k]P ). Bernstein’s x0
therefore provides pseudo-completeness for the ladder on Montgomery curves,
and an extremely simple and efficient key exchange based on the maps x 7→ xk.
6 Differential addition chains and higher-dimensional algorithms
An addition chain of length ℓ for a nonnegative integer k is an increasing
sequence of nonnegative integers, (c0, . . . , cℓ), with c0 = 1 and cℓ = k, sat-
isfying the following property: for all 0 < i ≤ m, there exist j and j′ such
that ci = cj + cj′ with 0 ≤ j ≤ j′ ≤ i. Addition chains have wide appli-
cation in public key cryptography due to their correspondence with group
exponentiations. In the context of elliptic curve cryptography, the existence of
a length ℓ addition chain (c0, . . . , cℓ) for k implies that the scalar multiplica-
tion (k, P ) 7→ [k]P can be computed using ℓ group operations. Thus, shorter
addition chains require fewer operations, and ultimately yield faster scalar
multiplication routines.
To use the fast x-line arithmetic of Montgomery curves, we need a special
type of addition chain. A differential addition chain of length ℓ for an integer
k is a sequence (c0, . . . , cℓ+1) with c0 = 0, c1 = 1, and (for our purposes)
k ∈ {cℓ, cℓ+1}, together with the property that for all 1 < i ≤ ℓ+1, there exist
i′, j and j′ such that ci = cj + cj′ and ci′ = cj′ − cj with 0 ≤ i′ ≤ j ≤ j′ < i.
The existence of a length-ℓ differential addition chain for k implies that the
pseudomultiplication (k,x(P )) 7→ x([k]P ) can be computed using a total of ℓ
differential operations (i.e., xADDs and xDBLs).
For an ℓ-bit scalar, the Montgomery ladder corresponds to a length 2ℓ− 1
differential addition chain (c0, . . . , c2ℓ); it requires two additions (one of which
is a doubling) for each bit of the scalar except the top bit, where only one
operation is required. In his search for shorter differential addition chains [39],
Montgomery proved that any ℓ-bit prime scalar requires at least 1.440ℓ x-line
operations, providing a lower bound on the number of operations required in a
differential addition chain in the worst case [39, §3]. (The best-case exponents,
powers of 2, require 1 operation per bit.)
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6.1 Montgomery’s Euclidean algorithms
The Montgomery ladder is a differential addition chain where the difference
index ci′ is in {1, 0} throughout; this corresponds to every xADD taking the
same difference x(P ). While this yields a simple and uniform algorithm, al-
lowing ci′ to vary further can yield shorter addition chains and faster scalar
multiplication.
Starting from the (subtractive) Euclidean algorithm for finding the greatest
common divisor of two integers, Montgomery derived several algorithms for
producing differential addition chains that were significantly shorter than his
ladder. The idea is to have a coprime auxiliary exponent alongside the input k,
and use the intermediate steps in the Euclidean algorithm to write down a
differential addition chain for k. This process computes a differential addition
chain for the auxiliary exponent as well, so these algorithms are inherently 2-
dimensional. Here we discuss one of these algorithms, PRAC, beginning with
its 2-dimensional core before returning to the 1-dimensional wrapper.
Algorithm 9 (EUCLID2D) is a version of Montgomery’s 2-dimensional PRAC
subroutine using only the “binary” transformations proposed by Montgomery
in [39, Table 4]. Given a multiscalar (m,n) and x(P ), x(Q), and x(P ⊖Q), it
computes x([m]P ⊕ [n]Q) using only xADD and xDBL operations. This variant
chain was used (for non-uniform scalar multiplications) by the implementation
of endomorphism-accelerated scalar multiplications on the curve in Example 3.
Since the difference arguments to the xADDs in EUCLID2D vary, we must
be careful about handling differences like x(O) and x(T ), which cause the
xADD and xDBL we defined in Algorithms 1 and 2 to degenerate. For simplicity,
in this section we suppose that xADD and xDBL have been extended to cover
all inputs (perhaps using conditional code, which is acceptable in these non-
uniform algorithms).
At first glance, EUCLID2D is much more complicated than LADDER, but
it is in fact remarkably simple and elegant. Suppose we want to compute
[m]P⊕[n]Q. Lines 1 through 12 maintain the following invariants: gcd(s0, s1) =
gcd(m,n) (the reader may recognise a subtractive Euclidean algorithm here),
and (x0, x1, x⊖) = (x(R0),x(R1),x(R1 ⊖ R0)) for some R0 and R1 in E(A,B)
such that [s0]R0⊕[s1]R1 = [m]P⊕[n]Q. Hence after the first while loop, having
arrived at s0 = 0, we must have s1 = gcd(m,n) and x1 = x([m/s1]P⊕[n/s1]Q).
To complete the task, it suffices to carry out a 1-dimensional pseudomultiplica-
tion of x1 by s1 = gcd(m,n) (in Line 16 we use LADDER); of course, if m and n
are random, then we expect s1 to be quite small at this point. The second
while loop (Lines 13-14) slightly optimizes this final 1-dimensional pseudo-
multiplication by using pure pseudo-doubling to exhaust any power of 2 in s1,
saving a few superfluous xADDs in the LADDER call.
If we had an efficient pseudo-tripling operation x(P ) 7→ x([3]P ) are rela-
tively efficient, it would be advantageous to include Montgomery’s “ternary”
transformations in the loop of Algorithm 9. Independent analyses by Stam [47,
Conjecture 3.29] and Bernstein [4, §3] conclude that this full version of Mont-
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Algorithm 9: EUCLID2D: 2-dimensional scalar pseudomultiplication
Input: m,n ∈ Z>0, and x(P ), x(Q), and x(Q⊖ P ) for some P and Q in E(A,B)(Fq)
Output: x([m]P ⊕ [n]Q)
1
(
(s0, s1), (x0, x1, x⊖)
)
←
(
(m,n), (x(P ),x(Q),x(Q ⊖ P ))
)
2 while s0 6= 0 do
3 if s1 < s0 then
4
(
(s0, s1), (x0, x1, x⊖)
)
←
(
(s1, s0), (x1, x0, x⊖)
)
5 if s1 ≤ 4s0 then // "Fibonacci" step
6
(
(s0, s1), (x0, x1, x⊖)
)
←
(
(s0, s1 − s0), (xADD(x1, x0, x⊖), x1, x0)
)
7 else if s0 ≡ s1 (mod 2) then
8
(
(s0, s1), (x0, x1, x⊖)
)
←
(
(s0,
s1−s0
2
), (xADD(x1, x0, x⊖), xDBL(x1), x⊖)
)
9 else if s1 ≡ 0 (mod 2) then
10
(
(s0, s1), (x0, x1, x⊖)
)
←
(
(s0, s1/2), (x0, xDBL(x1), xADD(x1, x⊖, x0))
)
11 else
12
(
(s0, s1), (x0, x1, x⊖)
)
←
(
(s0/2, s1), (xDBL(x0), x1, xADD(x0, x⊖, x1))
)
13 while s1 ≡ 0 (mod 2) do
14 (s1, x1)← (s1/2, xDBL(x1))
15 if s1 > 1 then
16 x1 ← LADDER(s1, x1)
17 return x1 // x1 = x([m]P ⊕ [n]Q)
gomery’s 2-dimensional PRAC subroutine computes x([m]P ⊕ [n]Q) for ℓ-bit
multiscalars (m,n) using an average total of 1.82ℓ differential operations.
Returning to the 1-dimensional problem, Montgomery suggests computing
x([k]P ) as x([m]P⊕[n]Q), where (m,n) andQ = [λ]P satisfy [m+nλ]P = [k]P
for some λ chosen to minimize the complexity of the pseudomultiplication. If
we can precompute x([λ]P ) from x(P ), then any ℓ-bit pseudomultiplication
can be performed as an ℓ/2-bit double-pseudomultiplication, and the resulting
differential addition chains have average length 0.92ℓ [47, Corollary 3.32]. But
without precomputation, and following his heuristics for choosing λ, Mont-
gomery’s PRAC algorithm produces differential addition chains of average
length 1.64ℓ for ℓ-bit scalars [47, Corollary 3.35].
Algorithm 10 is a simplified version of PRAC: we omit the repeated-tripling
step that, like the ternary steps omitted in its subroutine Algorithm 9, pre-
supposes the existence of rapid pseudo-tripling on E(A,B). The idea of taking
(m,n) = (⌊k/ϕ⌋, k−⌊k/ϕ⌋), where ϕ = (1+
√
5)/2 is the famous golden ratio,
is that this induces a sequence of roughly (12 logϕ 2)ℓ of the relatively cheap
so-called Fibonacci branch (Lines 5-6) of Algorithm 9, followed by roughly 12 ℓ
branches distributed as for random multiscalars. We refer the reader to Stam’s
thesis [47, §3.3.4] for further details and analysis.
6.2 Higher-dimensional ladder analogues
Although the short addition chains produced by Montgomery’s Euclidean al-
gorithms are suitable for his original application to ECM, their non-uniform
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Algorithm 10: PRAC: (simplified) 1-D Euclidean pseudomultiplication
Input: k ∈ Z>0, and x(P ) for some P in E(A,B)(Fq)
Output: x([k]P )
1 (s, x)← (k,x(P ))
2 while s ≡ 0 (mod 2) do
3 (s, x)← (s/2, xDBL(x))
4 r← ⌊s/ϕ⌋ where ϕ = (1 +
√
5)/2
5 x← EUCLID2D((r, s− r), (x, x,x(0)))
6 return x
and variable-time behavior makes them less suitable for application to ECC,
where uniformity is a mandatory first step towards hiding secret exponents
from adversaries exploiting side-channels. For cryptographic multiscalar mul-
tiplications, we may need higher-dimensional differential addition chains that
share the uniform behavior of the 1-dimensional Montgomery ladder.
Bernstein defines a 2-dimensional analogue of the Montgomery ladder in [4]
(the “binary chain”). Given an ℓ-bit multiscalar (m,n) and the values of x(P ),
x(Q), x(P ⊖Q) and x(P ⊕Q), this algorithm computes x([m]P ⊕ [n]Q) using
exactly 3ℓ differential operations. If xDBL and xADD are implemented in a uni-
form way, then Bernstein’s algorithm is also uniform: it is a sequence of ℓ steps,
each consisting of one xDBL and two xADDs. Further, in each of those steps, the
argument of xDBL is shared by one of the xADDs, and in some contexts these
calls may be merged to use some shared computations.
Every call to xADD in Bernstein’s algorithm takes one of the four input val-
ues x(P ), x(Q), x(P ⊖Q) and x(P ⊕Q) as its difference argument; this makes
it possible to recover the correct y-coordinate for the output x([m]P ⊕ [n]Q)
using exactly the same technique as in §4.3. This makes Bernstein’s chain a
viable option for computing the multiscalar multiplication during the verifica-
tion phase of signature schemes that take advantage of differential arithmetic.
Brown defined an n-dimensional analogue of the Montgomery ladder in [11].
Given an n-dimensional multiscalar (m1, . . . ,mn) in Z
n, Brown’s algorithm
uses x-line arithmetic to compute x([m1]P1⊕· · ·⊕ [mn]Pn) from the (3n−1)/2
input values x([e1]P1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ [en]Pn) with the ei ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and not all zero.
Example 3 (A Montgomery Q-curve reduction [18]) The Montgomery curve
E : y2 = x(x2 +Ax+ 1) over Fp2 = F2127−1(
√
−1)
with A = 45116554344555875085017627593321485421+ 2415910908
√
−1 has
#E(Fp) = 4r and #E ′(Fp) = 8r′, where r and r′ are 252- and 251-bit primes,
respectively. In [18] we see that E is equipped with an efficiently computable
endomorphism ψ of degree 2p, which acts on E(Fp2)[r] as [λ] where λ2 ≡ −2
(mod r). The classic Gallant–Lambert–Vanstone (GLV) technique [25] could
be used to compute 1-dimensional scalar multipications [k]P as 2-dimensional
multiplications [m]P ⊕ [n](ψ(P )), with m and n of roughly 128 bits. The
scalar multiplication implementation in [18] transports the GLV approach to
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the x-only setting, simultaneously exploiting Montgomery arithmetic. First,
we compute x(P ) 7→ x(ψ(P )) and x(P ) 7→ x((ψ− 1)P ) = x(ψ(P )⊖P ). Then
given any k in [0, r) we can compute x([k]P ) = x([m]P ⊕ [n]ψ(P )), where m
and n are 128-bit scalars, using Algorithm 9 for public scalars and Bernstein’s
uniform 2-dimensional binary chain for private scalars.
7 Generalizations and other applications
The Montgomery ladder is a general algorithm that works in any abelian
group, and in group quotients where analogues of xADD are available. The
most interesting groups of this kind—at least from a cryptographic point of
view—are other models of elliptic curves, and Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves.
7.1 The Montgomery ladder on other models of elliptic curves
The Montgomery ladder can be applied to any model of an elliptic curve, using
either the usual addition and doubling operations, or the analogue of x-only
arithmetic. For Weierstrass models, the chief interest in the Montgomery lad-
der is its side-channel resistance when computing scalar multiples with secret
scalars, as explored by Brier and Joye in [10]. Gaudry and Lubicz [27] used
the classical complex-analytic theory of theta functions to derive pseudo-group
law formulæ for P1 ∼= Eλ/〈⊖〉, where Eλ : y2 = x(x − 1)(x − λ) is a Legendre
model. Their formulæ offer trade-offs with the xADD and xDBL operations on
Montgomery curves, which could make them favorable in certain scenarios.
Castryck, Galbraith, and Farashahi [14] made the striking suggestion of
using Montgomery curves in conjunction with their corresponding twisted
Edwards models. The transformations of (4) and (5) are extremely easy to
compute; this allows a mixed arithmetic, passing back-and-forth between x-
only pseudo-additions on the Montgomery curve and v-only pseudo-doublings
on the corresponding Edwards curve.
7.2 The Montgomery ladder on hyperelliptic curves
The Montgomery ladder has been applied with great success in hyperelliptic
cryptography based on genus-2 curves. The story begins with Smart and Sik-
sek [46], who observed that we can use pseudo-additions to instantiate Diffie–
Hellman key exchange on Kummer surfaces (quotients of Jacobians of genus-2
curves by ±1). Duquesne [20] made this concrete by combining the ladder with
explicit formulæ for arithmetic on genus-2 curves of the form H : y2 = xf(x),
where f is a squarefree degree-4 polynomial. While the factor of x on the
right-hand-side also appears in the defining equations of Montgomery curves,
Duquesne’s curves are not a true genus-2 Montgomery analogue: we would
expect a particularly simple action on the Jacobian of the elements of the
kernel of a (2, 2)-isogeny factoring [2], for example, mirroring the special form
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of the translation-by-T map on Montgomery curves, but no such structure
is imposed by Duquesne’s form. Nevertheless, this special curve form allows
a small speedup over general genus-2 arithmetic. Duquesne later described
the Montgomery ladder on Kummer surfaces of arbitrary genus-2 curves [21],
building on Flynn’s arithmetic of general Kummer surfaces [13, Chapter 3].
Gaudry used the Montgomery ladder for efficient pseudomultiplication on
a model of the Kummer with especially fast pseudo-addition and pseudo-
doubling operations [26], building on observations of D. V. and G. V. Chud-
novsky [15]. Here, the efficiency really is a consequence of a special 2-torsion
structure: all of the 2-torsion points are defined over Fq, and their translations
act linearly on the Kummer by diagonal and permutation matrices. This ap-
proach has successfully used in high-speed Diffie–Hellman implementations [9,
6,44], and a hyperelliptic generalization of ECM factorization [17].
An analogue of y-coordinate recovery (see §4.3) exists in genus 2: Chung
and the authors give an explicit algorithm in [16], recovering Jacobian elements
from the output of the Montgomery ladder on the Kummer. This enables the
implementation of full signature schemes using Kummer surfaces [44].
All of these ideas and techniques are carried much further in the setting of
higher-dimensional abelian and Kummer varieties by Lubicz and Robert [36].
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